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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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
ACSI-IA

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Dulles, Chairman, Intelligence Advisory
Committee
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming Jr., Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Major General Millard Lewis, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, United States Air Force
Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

The attached memorandum of conversation which reflects on the
current developments in Indonesia is forwarded for your information.

1 Incl
TAB A


ROBERT A. SCHOW
Major General
ACoS, Intelligence

Army review(s)
completed.

Regraded Unclassified

when Separated from TAB A

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001200080046-3

ACTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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TAB "A"

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH INDONESIAN ARMY OFFICERS
28 JANUARY 1958

Participants: Lieutenant Colonel D. I. Pandjaitan, Assistant Military Attache, Bonn, Germany
Lieutenant Colonel M. Panggabean, recent graduate of Allied Officers Course, The Infantry School, Ft Benning, Georgia
Mr. E. D. Sorenson, Indonesia-Malaya Specialist, ACSI

1. Pandjaitan and Panggabean are brothers-in-law and both are Christian Sumatrans from Tapanuli. Although both officers are outspokenly anti-Communist, they are strongly opposed to the political dominance of the Javanese and are scornful of the "blind and stupid" Javanese response to President Sukarno. Despite their lack of respect for Sukarno, both officers insisted that a realistic consideration of the voting potential on Java and Sukarno's position as the recognized leader of Indonesia's revolution precludes the formation of any Government for a united Indonesia without Sukarno. Sukarno must be "used" until the "right time" arrives. Both officers blame Indonesia's troubles on improper coordination and planning. This criticism applies both to the Central Government and to the efforts of the opposition, in which group they placed themselves.

2. Pandjaitan claims that a majority of the "younger officers" in the Indonesian Army has lost faith in the extremist views respectively represented by Army Chief of Staff Nasution and "dissident" Colonel Simbolon. These younger officers regard Colonel Kawilarang, currently Army Attache in Washington, as their "spiritual leader" for reuniting the Indonesian Army. Pandjaitan's "mission" to Washington was for the express purpose of delivering a request by the younger officers for Kawilarang to return to Indonesia and use his influence to prevent the fragmentation of the Republic.

3. Pandjaitan also stated that the "younger officer group" was disturbed and becoming disillusioned about U.S. policy toward Indonesia. They did not understand why the U.S., which had helped Indonesia obtain her independence, was "deserting" her now. The Army does not regard the New Guinea question as a paramount issue in itself, but that as long as it remains an obsession of Sukarno it will be a critical factor in Indonesian affairs. These officers have waited in vain for the United States to take the lead in "neutralizing" the New Guinea problem and thus removing it as an "emotional" issue for Sukarno to exploit. Pandjaitan asserts that before his visits to the United States, the USSR and China in 1956, Sukarno was beginning to overcome his suspicions of the United States (as a "capitalist" nation). However, the contrast between the U.S. position on New Guinea and that of the Soviet and Chinese again swung Sukarno away from the West. These officers ask "what must we do to get U.S. support?"

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Memorandum of Conversation with Indonesian Army Officers

4. Pandjaitan also averred that both the Chief of Army Intelligence and General Nasution had assured the U.S. Army Attache in Djakarta that the Army was removing suspected Communists from influential positions as rapidly as they were discovered. Somewhat excitedly, then, Colonel Pandjaitan stated, "If the U.S. knows of any Communists, let them tell us, and we will have them removed. If the U.S. says that General Gatot Subroto is more acceptable than Nasution, and will give us arms, we can make that come about in three months time. We will do anything except shoot Sukarno or attack the Communists without proof of illegal actions on their part. In our country now we cannot arrest Communists just because they are Communists; we will remove them--so (gesture as stabbing with a knife)--if they step out of line, but, they are careful."

5. Pandjaitan asserted that he had seen Colonel Jani (the head of the Indonesian military purchasing mission currently in Eastern Europe) in Belgrade and that Jani stated that he had the authority to break off all negotiations with the satellites and go to Washington if the United States agreed to furnish Indonesia with reimbursable military aid. Moreover, even if U.S. aid were not forthcoming, Jani hoped to be able to keep Bloc purchases for the Army to a bare minimum.

6. Concerning reports that separate states will be declared in Sumatra and/or Celebes, both Pandjaitan and Panggabean asserted that the several councils do not have sufficient strength to carry out their threats. Panggabean stated that these groups were weak from the outset, but that they had succeeded because the Central Government under Ali Sastroamidjojo, was even weaker. Moreover, Panggabean asserted that much of the support initially developed because of the injustices and inequalities in the relations between Java and the outer islands, was currently dissipating because of the dangers of disunity in the Republic.

7. Both officers left Washington last week. Panggabean will accompany Pandjaitan to Bonn for a short visit before returning to Indonesia. He has not been told his next assignment.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

This is for your information. *Aug*

Copies of this report have been sent
to General Cabell, DD/P and DD/I.

AAB *117-3*
gve

6 Feb 58

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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